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The Renewal and Persistence of Group Identification in American Politics 
Matt A. Barreto and Francisco I. Pedraza, University of Washington 
 
In 1965 Raymond Wolfinger made three important claims in his article, “The 
development and persistence of ethnic voting,” that have not been significantly revisited in 
40 years.  First, that national origin identification remains salient for members of immigrant 
groups in America.  Second, that ethnic group identity directly influences partisanship – 
“members of an ethnic group show an affinity for one party or the other which can not be 
explained solely as a result of other demographic characteristics,” (896).  Third, that the 
straight line assimilationist theory that ethnic groups eventually shed their ethnic ties is 
contradicted by the actual evidence.  A common finding in the 1960s was that ethnic identity 
persisted into the third and fourth generation, contrary to the expectations of sociologist and 
political scientists. What Wolfinger and others could not have seen coming in 1965 were the 
new waves of Latin American and Asian immigrants coming to America and creating vibrant 
new ethnic groups with strong levels of group attachment and identity (indeed, Wolfinger 
stated, “mass immigration ended fifty years ago”).  Since 1965, more than 30 million 
immigrants have come to America – 85% of whom are not European – reinvigorating the 
debate over ethnic group identification and political participation. 
Hispanics or Latinos1 now represent the largest ethnic minority group in the United 
States, surpassing Blacks in total population in 2003.  The Latino electorate also represents 
the fastest growing segment of the American vote, increasing by 54% from 1996 to 2004 and 
estimated to number 10 million registrants in 2008.  Focusing on “old immigrant” groups, 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we use the words Hispanic and Latino interchangeably, and rely on the traditional grouping of 
Latinos found in social science research.  Latinos are those people living permanently in the United States who 
trace their ancestry to any of the Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America. This obviously excludes persons 
from Brazil, Haiti, and other non-Spanish speaking countries in Latin America.  However, it is also important 
to note that the category Hispanic or Latino is a self-identifying ethnic group in the U.S. census and most social 
science surveys. 
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some scholars have stated that group identity and ethnic coalitions from the New Deal era 
are dead (Stanley and Niemi 1995; 2006; Waters 1990).  In fact, in national elections there is 
no noticeable gap in the voting patterns of Americans of Italian or Irish descent, and 
Catholics are among the least cohesive of social groups today in their voting patterns (e.g. 
table 11.1 in Lewis-Beck et. al. 2008).  Given the incredible diversity of the American 
electorate in 2008, an important question remains: does ethnic group identity influence 
partisanship, and if it does, how strong or weak is the effect? 
Recently, The American Voter Revisited has taken up this precise question of social 
group identification (chapter 11) in a comparison of six groups in the American electorate.  
Lewis-Beck and his colleagues examine the group identity and partisan cohesion of African 
Americans, Women, Jews, Catholics, Union members and Hispanics. In short, they find 
evidence that social group identity is salient to presidential vote choice: “while different life 
situations may shape the vote in their own right, they essentially operate independently of 
group membership, which has an effect unique to itself,” (311). However the small sample 
size of subgroups in the American National Election Study (ANES) and limited questions on 
group identity prevent a comprehensive analysis or discussion of this topic in The American 
Voter Revisited, as the authors lament in many parenthetical notes2.  In particular, Latino or 
Hispanic Americans are an ideal ethnic group to examine in pursing this question given their 
size, growth rate, and large immigrant population.  Further, the Latino vote has been hotly 
pursued by both Democratic and Republican Presidential candidates in 2000, 2004, and 
                                                 
2 For example, in explaining Table 11.3 regarding strength of group identity in 2000, the authors note, 
“unfortunately, this question was not available in the 2004 NES,” (312).  Later, in explaining why they do not 
provide results for Hispanics, Blacks, or Jews in Table 11.5 the authors note, “not all of our secondary groups 
could be examined, because of issues of sample size or cell size. And in one case we had to substitute a feeling 
thermometer measure because the legitimacy measure was absent,” (315). 
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especially 2008.  By many measures, Latinos are the ethnic group of interest in American 
politics today. 
In this paper, we argue that group identification matters to Latinos, and that the 
ANES significantly underestimates the degree of ethnic identification among Latino 
registered voters.  Despite the increase in interest in Latino voters by scholars and campaign 
managers, the ANES has provided irreconcilably bad data on the largest minority population 
in America.  The data limitations of the ANES make it difficult at best, and impossible at 
worst, to say anything about Latino voters vis-à-vis other social groups of voters that 
scholars have analyzed over the years.  In addressing the issue of ethnic group identity and 
voting among Latinos, it is important first to discuss the methodological issues surrounding 
the Latino sample in the ANES, and describe the various caution signs, that we think appear 
around every corner.  Next, using the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), we explore in 
detail the degree and influence of ethnic group identity among Latinos.  In short, we find 
that ethnic group identity is much stronger among Latinos than data from the ANES 
suggests, and that ethnic identification can often be a primary avenue of engaging the 
political system, often trumping even partisanship.  As a result of a large immigrant 
population, continued and widespread discrimination against Latinos, and new mobilization 
efforts that encourage ethnic appeals, the Latino electorate embodies the renewal and 
persistence of group identification in American politics.  
While there are several similarities between the immigrant experience at the turn of 
the century and that of the contemporary wave of Latino immigration, there is at least one 
important difference that portends major political implications – continued migration flows.  
It is true that Irish and Italians experienced discrimination in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and that ethnic voting pattern persisted for some time, as noted by Wolfinger (1965) 
 4
and Parenti (1967).  However, Italian and Irish American voters eventually shed their overt 
group identity in the decades following these observations and became white Americans.  
While race is certainly an important factor, a second potential reason is that the number of 
Irish and Italian immigrants to the United States dropped dramatically by the 1950s, and the 
flow from these countries became but a trickle of what they once were in the early twentieth 
century.  In stark contrast, the flow of Latino immigrants picked up beginning in the late 
1960s and shows little sign of slowing.  Not only do racial differences distinguish Mexicans 
and Puerto Ricans from Irish and Italians, but the large and steady immigration flow of 
Latinos carries very distinct implications for ethnic group identity many decades into the 
future.  
Thus, it is important to understand the immigrant experience of this new group, 
Latinos, and the process of political incorporation since the 1970s, when they replaced 
European ethnics, as the new “ethnic” group in American politics. 
 
Ethnic Group Politics 
As Lewis-Beck et al (2008) note in their chapter on social group identification, not all 
group memberships drive political behavior.  Individuals can be grouped into objective 
categories, but membership in such categories does not necessarily lead to distinct political 
behavior (Huddy 2003).  For example, we might group individuals according to gender, and 
half the population would be said to be a member of the female grouping.  Such 
membership is not likely to translate into individual level politically meaningful behavior, 
unless that membership is internalized as a collective identity (i.e. feminist).  For political 
scientists, then, the distinction between group membership and group identity is important 
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to make because it helps us sort through which social groups we might expect to shape some 
individual’s political behavior, and which ones do not. 
 The literature points to subjective group identification as the common link between 
group membership and collective political behavior.  Subjective group identification involves 
an individual integrating membership in a particular group as part of his or her self-identity, 
and recognizing interdependence in the group (Huddy 2003).  This realization of 
interdependence, also known as linked fate (Dawson 1994), when combined with the desire to 
address the group’s social position through collective action, generates what Miller et al. 
(1981) call group consciousness.  The development of the group consciousness concept has been 
particularly useful to political scientists because of its application across various kinds of 
groups, ethnic, racial, economic, dominant and subordinate.  Indeed, while Miller et al. 
(1981) report that the strongest impact of group consciousness on political participation is 
found among African Americans, there is also evidence that group consciousness is a factor 
for women, the poor, and businessmen (507).  Whatever the group, individual group 
member awareness of shared interests or a common fate is what seems to matter in order 
that the potential for cohesive political action be realized. 
For our question regarding the persistence and strength of group identity in politics, 
it is useful to consider the distinction between groups that are formed around voluntary 
membership, such as unions and Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and those that are 
ascriptive, such as race and ethnicity.  To be clear, both types of groups have the potential to 
translate identities into political action; however, the factors that contribute to the strength 
and persistence of group identity seem to favor identities that are ascribed more than those 
that are acquired (Huddy 2003).  Before discussing a key difference between the two groups 
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that may account for greater strength and persistence among ascribed identites, it is useful to 
look at some similarites. 
Regardless of whether the identity is ascribed or acquired, the degree to which each 
group influences members’ political outlook depends on how strongly individual members 
hold the group identity.  Normative group beliefs, so the thinking goes, are more likely to be 
internalized by those that highly value their group memberships (Conover 1984, Tate 1993, 
Dawson 1994).  Yet, the dynamics of an individual’s identity and the strength of that identity 
are not accurately captured by an account that views internalization as a solitary process.  
Indeed, group identity, by definition, is a social process.  To remind us of this point, Uhlaner 
(1989) provides an important reinterpretation of individual participation in collective action 
that begins by pointing out that political behavior is a social phenomenon, that is, one that is 
contextualized by our relationships with others.  Part of the social environment includes 
leadership, and Uhlaner shows how union leaders mobilize members through group loyalty 
appeals, and how this explains higher rates of turnout.  What is recognized by group leaders 
is that, “[l]oyalty within a group translates into power outside it (Uhlaner 1989:392).  Hence, 
in addition to the strength of identification among individual members, ascriptive and 
acquired group memberships persist, in part, because leaders use group appeals. 
As the research team of The American Voter Revisited acknowledges, the role of elites is 
important, and “political parties,” in particular, “exercise a pivotal role in ensuring this 
transmission of group distinctivenss, from election to election” (318).  Indeed, early research 
on political parties argued that patronage served the goal of categorizing the electorate in an 
easy way (i.e. ethnicity), which facilitated later marshalling of votes at election time 
(Moynihand and Wilson 1906).  Parties ensure the role of groups by courting voters as 
members of groups, and such appeals have long-lasting effects, as evidenced by partisanship 
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and party coalition research that shows how changes in group support for parties has been 
gradual and taken decades to show real dramatic change (Stanley and Niemi 2006).  Aside 
from similarities in terms of the role of leadership and the degree to which individuals value 
a group identity in explaining the persistence of group political behavior there is one key 
difference that is highlighted in the race and ethnic group politics research.  
Two early pieces connecting ethnic identity and political behavior point out that the 
development of ethnic politics is partly because of high levels of immigration, residential 
segregation by national origin group, discrimination and economic exploitation of 
immigrants by the receiving community (Wolfinger 1965, Parenti 1967).  Although 
Wolfinger (1965) gives a nod to the role of discrimination, his explanation for the 
persistence of ethnic politics centers on the mobilization of ethnics by political leaders.  The 
persistence of ethnic politics is a matter of “the intensity of ethnic identification and the level of ethnic 
relevance in the election” (Wolfinger 1965:905, emphasis in the original), and this intensity is 
communicated to voters most powerfully when they see a co-ethnic on the ballot.  By 
contrast, Parenti (1967) contends that ethnic identity that persists after mainstream 
acculturation is a function not only of the individual’s preference to maintain ties because it 
helps one know who one is, but it also persists because of discrimination.  “Few things so 
effectively assure the persistence of in-group awareness as out-group rejection, and much of 
the ethnic cradle-to-grave social structure, often considered ‘clannish,’ is really defensive” 
(723).   
While Wolfinger (1965), Parenti (1967), Dahl (1961) and others all noted the patterns 
of “ethnic politics” among European immigrants, few stopped to ask whether the findings 
were unique, or a general pattern in America.  In revisiting the question of ethnic identity, 
Waters states that “these debates were all based on the assumption – only sometimes made 
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explicit – that what happened to white immigrants from Europe would provide a model or a 
comparison point for the experience of other ethnic and racial groups,” (Waters 1990, 6).  
Twenty-five years after Wolfinger’s article, Waters concluded that ethnic identification no 
longer persisted for European ethnics, and that newer non-white ethnic groups were the 
important observation groups: “so for all the ways in which I have shown that ethnicity does 
not matter for white Americans, I could show how it does still matter very much for non-
whites,” (Waters 1990, 156). 
In their chapter on the role of social groupings Lewis-Beck et. al. (2008) concern 
themselves principally with measuring the strength of group identification, and are less 
concerned with their roots.  Turning to a discussion on the persistence of group 
identification in politics, however, prompts us to reflect on these roots.  Scholarship on the 
development and persistence of ethnic/ racial group identity (Wolfinger 1965; Parenti 1967; 
Miller et al. 1981) suggests three factors will ensure that analysis of political behavior by 
social groupings will remain a useful approach to studying politics.  First, as mentioned 
above, is the electoral incentive pursued by political elites.  Second, in the case of Latinos, 
the necessary demographic underpinnings of a Latino identity will continue to exist in the 
United States far into the 21st century.  The largest ethnic group in the United States, Latino 
population growth shows no sign of slowing.  Third, it is difficult to characterize the 
reception of Latinos by the dominant society as welcoming.  While the economic 
opportunities for many Latino immigrants have certainly been better than those available in 
their country of origin, (and in the case of Cubans in Miami, the motivations were political), 
for many Latinos, the social experience has been nothing less than rejection, and the political 
environment has been outright hostile as revealed by the immigration debate since 1990.   
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The discriminatory aspect of the social and political milieu have been shown to have 
important impacts on the political orientation of Latinos.  In summary, we expect strong 
ethnic identity to persist for Latinos well into the twenty-first century.  First, we report 
strong identification among naturalized Latino citizens, who constitute only a share of the 
total potential Latino electorate pool, but can be expected to continue being a sizeable block 
of the total Latino electorate for the next thirty years.  Second, many of the Latinos entering 
politics for the first time since the mid-1990s did so in response to perceived threats (ie CA 
Proposition 187, 209, 227), and it has been shown that this threat shaped their political 
orientation, including naturalization rates (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001), turnout 
(Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001), political sophistication (Pantoja and Segura 2003), party 
attachments (Nicholson and Segura 2006), attitudes toward government (Bowler, Nicholson 
and Segura 2008), and policy preferences (Sanchez 2006; Branton 2007). 
The immigrant experience is useful because it allows us to answer questions about 
political socialization of individuals in a way that is unavailable by examining only native 
born voters.  In particular, this paper will take up the party identification among Latinos 
across immigrant generation to determine what factors influence their partisanship.  Is it 
socioeconomic status and life cycle factors, or does discrimination, immigration, and social 
group identification carry more weight in understanding Latino partisan choices?  First, it is 
important to distinguish between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos when discussing 
partisanship.  Cubans historically demonstrate high rates of Republican affiliation while non-
Cuban Latinos are just the opposite. Despite these different “choices” we argue that the 
same factors are at play in influencing Latino party preferences: years lived in the U.S. among 
immigrants, strength of ethnic identification, and degree of perceived discrimination.  We 
explore the dynamics of social group identity and Latino partisanship using data from the 
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2006 LNS, as a way to extend on the analysis by Lewis-Beck et. al. on the importance of 
social group identity in American politics today. 
 
Latino Ethnic Politics 
 In today’s political environment, group identification is more relevant than ever 
before.  This is the result of a steady decline in party strength and party machines, and the 
increase in campaign technology and targeted voter appeals.  At the same time that parties 
were losing their steam, campaigns were finding new ways to compartmentalize the 
electorate into social groups.  Most famously “soccer moms” were a contested group of 
voters in the 1990s, and many new examples abound.  Voter databases and consumer 
information allow campaigns to directly target groupings of voters with a specific message. 
All the while, the Latino electorate has been gaining attention each presidential election  
(de la Garza and DeSipion 2004). The result has been that the typical Spanish surname voter 
receives an overtly ethnic appeal, in the way of direct mail, phone calls, or knocks on the 
front door.  Campaign materials often appear in Spanish and English, prominent Latino 
officials endorse the candidate, and immigrant themes are plentiful in campaign ads targeted 
at Latino households.  The result is that Latino voters are constantly reminded of their 
ethnic identity, in a way that directly connects Latino identity with politics. 
 In addition to the decline in parties and the rise in micro-targeting, some additional 
trends, and established findings, lead us to believe that ethnic group identity will remain 
salient for Latino voters.  First, immigration from Latin America continues at a steady pace.  
This has two immediate effects – one is to grow the Latino population in the United States, 
bringing more attention (both good and bad) to this minority group.  The second is to root 
the Latino experience in America in the immigrant experience.  Already, 60% of Latino 
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adults are foreign born, and about 20% are second generation with immigrant parents. While 
Italian and Irish immigration flows were cut off in the 1920s, never to re-appear, this is not 
the case for Latinos.  Next, discrimination against Latinos continues, and anti-immigrant 
rhetoric and public policy is thriving.  The more perceived and real discrimination against a 
community, the more likely they are to turn to their in-group for support.  To this point, 
Sanchez validates this with public opinion data, and finds exposure to discrimination 
substantially increases Latino group consciousness (2006). 
 In particular, when ethnic cues are triggered, such as by a fellow Latino candidate, or 
harsh rhetoric against immigrants, ethnic identity may be even stronger than other forms of 
group identity such as partisanship or union membership.  Barreto (2007) finds that 
Republican candidate Orlando Sanchez received a large majority of the Latino vote in the 
2001 Houston mayoral election, as did Green Party candidate Matt Gonzalez in San 
Francisco’s 2003 mayoral election – both running against Democrats.  In Los Angeles in 
2001, James Hahn received every major union endorsement, yet Antonio Villaraigosa won 
Latino union members by a 4-to-1 margin according to exit polls. 
 Finally, Latino voters are much more likely to respond to ethnic campaign appeals.  
Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee (2000) find Latinos are significantly more likely to vote in the 
1996 Presidential election if they received mobilization from a Latino group, as compared to 
non-Latino groups, or no mobilization at all.  Similarly, Ramírez (2005; 2007) finds low-
propensity Latino voters respond positively to non-partisan Latino civic groups and behave 
like high propensity voters.  In the 2000 election, DeFrancesco-Soto and Merolla (2006) 
found that Spanish language campaign commercials had a positive and significant impact on 
Latino turnout, however English commercials had no effect at all.  With regard to vote 
choice in 2000, Nuño (2007) found that when Latino Republicans canvassed for votes 
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among Latino households they successfully increased Bush’s vote share.  However, when 
Anglo Republicans contacted Latinos, they drove down votes for Bush.  Likewise, when 
Republican Pete Wilson ran for re-election as California Governor in 1994 endorsing Prop. 
187 and using strong anti-immigrant rhetoric the result was Latinos flocking to the 
Democratic Party (Barreto and Woods 2007).  Thus, ethnic identity is, and will remain salient 
for Latinos vis-à-vis the political system for generations to come.  
 
The ANES Hispanic Sample 
As the number of Latino adult citizens has increased over the past three decades the 
number of Latino interviews in the ANES has increased from 4% of all interviews in 1980 to 
8% of all interviews in 2004.  This increase has tempted many scholars to examine and 
compare Latinos in the ANES with other racial and ethnic groups to better understand 
political incorporation and participation among Hispanics in the United States.  However, 
there are significant problems with the ANES Hispanic sample that deserve discussion, yet 
are often relegated to footnotes.  Barreto and Segura (2007) have illustrated the deficiencies 
of the ANES and conclude that data and research on Latinos from 1980 – 2004 is suspect.  
They point to two important concerns in the current ANES Latino sample which “bias the 
national sample and dramatically limit the usefulness of the resulting data: the absence of 
Spanish-language interviews and the small and unrepresentative sub-sample,” (Barreto and 
Segura 2007, 4).  
Most critically, the ANES does not translate the survey instrument into Spanish and 
interviews with Spanish-speaking households are skipped.  Approximately 60% of all Latino 
adults are foreign-born yet no interviews are conducted in Spanish.  Instead, ANES 
interviewers search for a similarly situated replacement household in which the respondent is 
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proficient in English.  This introduces an incredible bias by first, excluding Spanish-
dominant households, and second, replacing those individuals with much more assimilated 
Latino respondents.  For almost any dependent variable in Latino politics, the independent 
variable “Spanish speaker” is statistically significant, yet this half of the Latino population is 
excluded.  ANES interviewers are required to keep careful notes, especially about 
respondents that decline or terminate interviews.  In 2004, 27% of attempted interviews with 
Latino households were declined or terminated due to language.  Further, some respondents 
who are included, may actually prefer to answer the 60 minute survey in Spanish.  While 
many immigrants have a good command of conversational English, they may not be 
prepared to read large portions of English text in the booklet and answer questions in 
English such as “Where would you place [ CANDIDATE] on defense spending? Do you 
think he wants to greatly increase, somewhat increase…”  Thus, it greatly skews the Latino 
sample towards second and third generation, and the few immigrants who are included are 
far more assimilated than the typical Latino immigrant. 
The second problem Barreto and Segura identified is the small and unrepresentative 
sample of Hispanics who are included in the ANES.  In 1980 only 61 respondents self-
identified as Latino and in 2004 an even 100 Latinos were included.  In other years, as the 
overall sample ANES sample was larger so too was the number of Latinos however it was 
consistently a very small sample, around 7-8% of the overall dataset.  This is only one 
problem with the sample, a larger problem is that due to the multi-stage cluster sampling, 
and a high degree of Latino/non-Latino residential segregation, a great deal of Latinos who 
are included tend to be picked up in non-Latino neighborhoods.  According to Barreto and 
Segura, “as a consequence of the interaction of the small sample size, the high levels of 
residential segregation of America in general and Latinos specifically, and the NES sampling 
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method, the resulting Latino sample is often bizarrely skewed on geographic and national-
origin dimensions,” (2007, 6).  For example, in the 2000 ANES 11% of Latinos were from 
New York and 3% were from Florida while in 2004 2% were from New York and 14% were 
from Florida.  Given the large differences between Latinos in New York and Florida such 
changes in the ANES sample make the underlying data unreliable from one year to the next.  
Similarly, in 2004, only a single Latino respondent was interviewed in Illinois, New Mexico 
and Arizona combined.  Given the unrepresentative nature of the Latino population by state, it 
is not surprising that the population is also skewed by national origin.  In 1984, 72% of 
Latinos in the ANES were of Mexican origin and in 2000 only 39% of Latinos were Mexican 
(in reality 67% of Latinos were of Mexican origin according to the 2002 CPS).  Likewise, 
Puerto Ricans jump from 20% of the sample in1980 to 11% in 1992, a year in which “other” 
Latinos comprised 45% of the sample.  Finally, there appears to be a significant skew in the 
age of Latino respondents.  Whether it is a result of the English language interviews, limited 
number of immigrants in the sample, or interviewer bias towards younger respondents, the 
ANES produced a Latino sample in which 61% of respondents were age 18-39.  In contrast, 
the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute 2004 national survey of Latino voters found that just 27% 
of Latino registered voters were age 18-39, a 34 percentage point discrepancy. 
The clear implication is that the Hispanic data collected in the ANES are suspect in 
any given year, never approaching a representative sample of Hispanic voters.  Further, the 
lack of Spanish surveys introduces a systematic bias in which immigrant, less educated, and 
less assimilated Latinos are excluded from participation.  While the advantage of the ANES 
is that it provides a national sample of Americans to compare across years, and across 
subgroups, the Latino subsample in the ANES is so poor that any analysis of the data is 
unjustifiable. 
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Data and Methodology 
For scholars interested in Latino politics, luckily the ANES is not the only source of 
data.  Over the past 20 years, numerous important surveys of Latino voters have been 
conducted that provide large sample sizes, bilingual interviewers, and nationally 
representative samples.  Among the surveys that are noteworthy are the 1989 Latino 
National Political Survey (LNPS), the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI) surveys 1996 – 
2004, the Pew Hispanic Center surveys 2000 – 2006, and the 2006 Latino National Survey 
(LNS).  Of all the available data, the LNS is the most recent and the most comprehensive in 
size and scope.  Conducted in 2006, the LNS interviewed a total of 8,634 Latino adults in 16 
states and asked more than 100 substantive questions (averaging 45 minutes in length).  The 
survey was administered by telephone using bilingual interviewers.  Overall, among citizen 
adults, 41% of interviews were conducted in Spanish and 59% in English. 
The LNS is an especially appropriate dataset to examine ethnic group identity among 
Latinos across generation for a couple of reasons.  First, because of the large overall sample 
size, we can reliably distinguish Latinos by four generational groups: first generation 
immigrants, second generation (US-born with immigrant parents), third generation (US-born 
with immigrant grandparents), and fourth generation (US-born with US-born parents and 
US-born grandparents).  Second, the LNS contains precise questions on ethnic group 
identity.  Here, we rely on the question, “in general, how strongly or not do you think of 
yourself as Hispanic or Latino?” with response options very strongly, somewhat strongly, 
not very strongly and not at all.  In addition, the LNS provides an opportunity to measure 
group identity among Latinos across national origin groups including Mexican, Cuban, 
Puerto Rican, Dominican, and Salvadoran – the five largest national origin groups.  Finally, 
we can disaggregate the Latino sample by language.  Using an index which asked 
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respondents to gauge their language abilities in English and Spanish, we classify Latinos as 
Spanish dominant, English dominant, and bilingual.  While the LNS sample frame targeted 
all Latino adults, in this paper we restrict our analysis to only citizens to match the ANES. 
The key dependent variable we are interested in is partisanship, specifically focusing 
on the degree of partisan agreement among Latinos.  While The American Voter Revisited used 
vote choice in the 2000 and 2004 elections, we detour slightly to focus on partisanship.  One 
advantage the ANES post-election survey has over the LNS is its proximity to the 
November election, making questions about presidential vote choice ideal.  In contrast, the 
LNS was conducted in the Spring of 2006, 16 months after the 2004 election, introducing 
recall bias into questions about vote choice in November 2004.  Thus, we rely on party 
identification, a far more stable measure for non-election surveys and still comparable to the 
vote choice models reported by Lewis-Beck et. al. (2008).  We construct party identification 
using a standard 7-point scale collapsed into three groups: Democrat, Republican, 
Independent.  We group Democratic leaners with Democrats and Republican leaners with 
Republicans, providing the best metric to calculate the Democrat-Republican gap. 
We provide two levels of analysis to explore Latino social group identity and how it 
effects partisan unity.  First, we replicate many of the descriptive tables in The American Voter 
Revisited, chapter 11, to determine whether or not group identity and group cohesion is 
stronger or weaker than reported in the ANES data.  Second, we rely on multinomial logit to 
determine the predictors of Latino party identification, specifically with an eye towards 
generation, language, and ethnic identification.  Beyond these independent variables, we also 
include a host of predictors known to be associated with Latino partisanship: national origin, 
age, income, education, marital status, religion, gender, years in the U.S., and union 
membership. 
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The Findings 
I. Descriptive Results 
Focusing on Latino eligible voters, we report several levels of partisan unity, similar 
to tables created by Lewis-Beck, et. al. (2008, chapter 11).  Instead of calculating the 
difference between the presidential vote for the Democratic minus the Republican, we 
calculate the partisan divide between Democratic and Republican affiliation.  Overall, we 
find much stronger levels of party unity and ethnic identification among Latinos using the 
LNS data than reported in the 2000-2004 ANES data.   
Table 1 reports the level of Democratic and Republican affiliation among Latinos, 
including for subgroups by national origin, generation, and language.  First, as we note 
above, it is important to distinguish between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos given the 
historic differences in party identification.  Table 1 confirms these differences.  Among all 
non-Cuban Latinos, the LNS reports a 42 point advantage for Democratic partisanship, 
while among Cubans there is a 21 point advantage for Republican partisanship – both 
groups demonstrating much strong group party unity than the non-Hispanic population.  
Further, the strong support for the Democratic party is consistent along national origin 
groups, with Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans all demonstrating over 
40-point partisanship gaps.   
Turning to immigrant generation, we find strong partisan unity among Latinos3 from 
first generation immigrants to fourth generation U.S. born.  Similar to studies of European 
ethnic referenced above, we find ethnic party unity into the fourth generation among 
Latinos.  In fact, subsequent generations (third and fourth) demonstrate slightly higher rates 
of Democratic partisanship than do Latino immigrants.  Finally, while some differences 
                                                 
3 Because of the different direction in partisan unity among Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos, we limit the sample 
to non-Cubans in the generational and language cross-tabs. 
 18
emerge due to language, the LNS data establish strong levels of party unity among Latinos 
who are English dominant, bilingual, or Spanish dominant – though this should not be a 
surprise given the consistency across generation. 
Table 1: Degree of Partisan Unity 
(replication of Table 11.1 in Lewis-Beck et. al.) 
 
Group Dem Rep Diff 
ANES Whites 41.7 49.5 -7.8 
ANES Non-Hispanic 48.4 41.7 6.7 
All Latinos 60.5 22.6 37.9 
Non-Cuban 62.5 20.5 42.0 
Cuban 32.1 53.2 -21.1 
Mexican 62.5 20.4 42.1 
Puerto Rican 62.5 20.6 41.9 
Dominican 68.1 10.2 57.9 
Salvadoran 62.4 19.4 43.0 
1st Gen 59.6 18.9 40.7 
2nd Gen 63.0 21.6 41.4 
3rd Gen 67.0 21.8 45.2 
4th Gen 64.6 21.3 43.3 
English 63.5 23.7 39.8 
Bilingual 62.7 20.9 41.8 
Spanish 60.9 16.2 44.7 
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey; 2004 ANES 
 
Overall, we find high levels of partisan unity among Latinos, however Lewis-Beck et. 
al. suggest that degree of group identity may be an intervening variable, and we agree.  If 
there is something unique about Latino identity which promotes Democratic partisanship 
for non-Cuban Latinos, and Republican partisanship for Cubans, we would expect partisan 
unity to be even higher for those who more closely invoke their Latino identity.  In table 2, 
we report the rates of ethnic group identity among Latinos and find overall high rates of 
ethnic identity – about 10 points higher than reported in the ANES data.  At the same time, 
there are interesting differences in the percent of Latinos who selected “very strong” as their 
ethnic identity across the subgroups reported in table 2. 
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Table 2: Strength of Group Identification 
(replication of Table 11.4 Lewis-Beck et. al.) 
 
 How strongly or not do you think of yourself as Hispanic or Latino 
Group 
Very 
Strong 
Somewhat 
Strong Strong
Not  
very 
Not 
at all 
Not 
Strong 
All Latinos 64.9 25.1 (90.0) 6.4 3.7 (10.1) 
Non-Cuban 65.2 25.1 (90.3) 6.2 3.5 (9.7) 
Cuban 61.0 23.9 (84.9) 8.7 6.4 (15.1) 
Mexican 62.8 26.9 (89.7) 6.8 3.5 (10.3) 
Puerto Rican 72.9 19.0 (91.9) 5.2 3.0 (8.2) 
Dominican 77.5 18.9 (96.4) 2.1 1.5 (3.6) 
Salvadoran 77.6 16.1 (93.7) 6.2 0.1 (6.3) 
1st Gen 70.5 22.1 (92.6) 5.4 2.1 (7.5) 
2nd Gen 69.1 24.5 (93.6) 2.7 3.7 (6.4) 
3rd Gen 58.4 29.5 (87.9) 7.6 4.5 (12.1) 
4th Gen 54.9 28.9 (83.8) 10.8 5.4 (16.2) 
English 53.2 30.6 (83.8) 10.4 5.8 (16.2) 
Bilingual 70.1 22.3 (92.4) 4.5 3.2 (7.7) 
Spanish 69.4 24.1 (93.5) 5.0 1.5 (6.5) 
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey 
 
For non-Cuban Latinos, 90% stated their Hispanic or Latino identity was strong, and 
85% of Cubans stated it was strong.  With respect to generation and language, a predictable 
pattern emerges that underscores the potential problems in the English-only ANES sample.  
Among first generation immigrants, 70% state their ethnic identity is very strong, and the 
same rate of ethnic identification is found among the second generation.  However, third 
generation Latinos dip to 58% very strong, and fourth generation register 55% very strong.  
Over successive generations, it is fair to say that Latinos do shed some degree of ethnic 
attachment. At the same time, over 80% of third and fourth generation Latinos still state 
their ethnic ID is somewhat or very strong.  Language shows a similar pattern with Spanish 
dominant registering the highest levels of Latino identity (70% very strong) and English 
dominant the lowest (53% very strong).  Given these distinctions, we expect that for all 
Latinos, across national origin, generation, and language, those with higher ethnic identity 
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will also demonstrate stronger partisan unity – a similar proposition made by Lewis-Beck et. 
al. in chapter 11. 
Table 3: Degree of Partisan Unity by Ethnic Identity 
(replication of Lewis-Beck et. al. Table 11.3) 
 
 
Strong 
Ethnic ID 
Weak 
Ethnic ID Differential 
All Latinos +42.8 +26.2     +16.6 
Non-Cuban +46.9 +29.2     +17.7 
Cuban -24.0 -3.6     -20.4 
Mexican +46.8 +26.4     +20.4 
Puerto Rican +47.5 +39.2     +8.3 
Dominican ~ ~      ~ 
Salvadoran ~ ~      ~ 
1st Gen +43.4 +28.5     +14.9 
2nd Gen +44.9 +23.4     +21.5 
3rd Gen +53.8 +34.3     +19.5 
4th Gen +52.3 +31.3     +21.0 
English +55.1 +23.5     +31.6 
Bilingual +45.0 +32.5     +12.5 
Spanish +43.4 +37.6     +5.8 
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey 
~ sample size too small for weak ethnic identifiers 
 
Table 3 compares the degree of Democratic unity among Latinos with strong ethnic 
identity and weak ethnic identity.  Non-Cubans with strong ethnic identity register a net 
Democratic advantage of 46.9 (64.4 D to 17.5 R) while those with weak ethnic identity show 
a 29.2 edge (56.1 D to 26.9 R) – a gap of about 18 points.  Likewise, Cubans with strong 
ethnic identity are far more likely to be Republicans (-24) than those with weak ethnic 
identity, where the Republican advantage among Cubans falls to only 3.6.  The importance 
of ethnic identity to partisan unity among Latinos is most noticeable when broken down by 
generation and language.  Among immigrants and Spanish dominant Latinos, the difference 
between strong and weak ethnic identifiers is less apparent.  However, for English dominant 
and later generation Latinos, having a strong degree of ethnic identification has obvious 
political implications.  English dominant Latinos with high ethnic identity maintain a 55.1 
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point Democratic advantage (70.9 D to 15.8 R).  In contrast, English dominant and weak 
ethnic identifiers have a 23.5 point Democratic edge (56.0 D to 32.5 R), a net gap of 31.6 
points based on ethnic identity.   
 
II. Multivariate results 
In addition to the descriptive results, which serve to replicate and extend the analysis 
by The American Voter Revisited, we are interested in further unraveling the relationship 
between generation, ethnic identity, and partisanship.  In particular, we are curious if the 
observed interaction between ethnic identity and immigrant generation holds when other 
correlates and control variable are accounted for.  Because of the close relationship between 
English proficiency and generation, as well as other correlates of acculturation such as 
educational attainment and income, it is necessary to run multivariate analysis to isolate the 
effects of generation when controlling for other factors – the tables above do not do this.  
We used four different regression techniques to assess Latino partisan unity: two different 
types of dependent variable, and two different approaches to the state-level effects of our 
16-state sample.    The four variations we include were first, two measures of our dependent 
variable, partisanship.  One version includes Democrats (and leaners) coded as 1, 
Independents coded as 2, and Republicans (and leaners) coded as 3 and we use multinomial 
logit to examine predictors of Democratic partisanship.  The second version excludes 
Independents are only focuses on differences between Democratic and Republican 
identifiers using logistic regression.  For both of these dependent variables, we accounted for 
state-level effects in two different ways.  First, we simply include a dummy variable for each 
of the 16 states in our sample, excluding Florida (the most Republican Latino state) as the 
comparison group.  This approach allows us to independently assess the effects of each state 
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in the model alongside our key independent variables, and also effectively controls for the 
differences in state political culture that are known to influence partisanship.  Second, we use 
a hierarchical linear model in which observations are nested at the state level.  Thus, our four 
estimations are: multinomial logit with state dummies, HLM multinomial logit nested by 
state, logit with state dummies, HLM logit nested by state. In this paper, we present results 
and charts based on multinomial logit, with dummy variables for each state, and full results 
for the other three techniques can be found in the appendix.  It should be noted that across 
all four sets of models the results are nearly identical (thus we are left with the task of 
deciding which procedure is the most accurate for our data, not which produces the most 
satisfying results!). 
Table 4 contains the regression results and changes in predicted probability for 
Latino partisanship.  Overall, we note many predictable and consistent findings with the 
literature on Latino partisanship.  For example, Cubans are significantly less likely to be 
Democrats, as compared to Mexican Americans, the excluded national origin group.  
Women are more Democratic than men, while married couples and home owners are less 
likely to be Democrats.  Catholics and union households are significantly more Democratic.  
With regard to state, we do find many statistically significant results for the state dummy 
variables.  As compared to Florida, the omitted state, 11 of the 15 remaining states are 
statistically different with respect to partisanship4. While language appeared to have an effect 
on structuring ethnic identity (table 2 above), with generation and ethnic identity in the 
model language does not have an independent effect on partisanship. 
 
                                                 
4 These results do not mean that each state is significantly different from all of the rest, only different from 
Florida.  However, when New York is omitted, 12 of the 15 remaining states are statistically different, and 
when California is omitted 9 of the 15 are different, so we do expect many of the states are indeed statistically 
unique from most of the other states. 
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit Regression Results for Latino Partisanship 
 
 Outcome for Democrat (y=1) Outcome for Indep (y=2) 
Independent variable Coef. (S.E.)  ∆  PP Coef. (S.E.)  ∆  PP
Generation -.2935 (.1495) * -.137 -.3490 (.2142) t -.071 
Ethnic ID -.0903 (.1095)   -.1344 (.1430)   
Generation x Ethnic ID .1008 (.0429) * .272 .0590 (.0600)   
Discrimination .1517 (.0484) ** .062 .1749 (.0609) ** .032 
Spanish scale .0300 (.0457)   .1654 (.0604) ** .117 
Puerto Rico -.1294 (.1640)   -.3031 (.2041)   
Cuba -1.338 (.2044) *** -.235 -1.223 (.2579) *** -.048 
Dominican .4261 (.3198)   .3092 (.3586)   
Central America -.2825 (.2051)   -.4804 (.2495) * -.035 
South America .2667 (.2679)   -.4313 (.3392)   
Age .0140 (.0029) *** .328 -.0127 (.0038) *** -.214 
Education .0091 (.0144)   -.0432 (.0178) * -.138 
Income -.0001 (.0001)   -6.1E-6 (3.5E-6) t -.025 
Female .3704 (.0884) *** .056 .3150 (.1119) ** .006 
Married -.1955 (.0960) * -.052 .0595 (.1237)   
Home owner -.3908 (.1131) *** -.061 -.2914 (.1393) * .000 
Catholic .4990 (.0923) *** .104 .1535 (.1159)   
Union household .2971 (.1181) ** .072 -.0451 (.1536)   
Arizona 1.076 (.2724) *** .191 .2859 (.3393)   
Arkansas .0623 (.2929)   .0253 (.3310)   
California .6296 (.2043) ** .144 -.0700 (.2512)   
Colorado .6168 (.2551) * .132 .0140 (.3318)   
D.C. metro .9791 (.2720) *** .157 .4778 (.3341)   
Georgia .0846 (.2751)   -.5184 (.3978)   
Illinois 1.279 (.2379) *** .216 .4096 (.2863)   
Iowa .6703 (.2669) ** .115 .3169 (.3153)   
Nevada .4249 (.2674)   -.0978 (.3353)   
New Jersey .5476 (.2175) ** .123 -.0479 (.2741)   
New Mexico .7350 (.2345) ** .207 -.8751 (.3652) * -.127 
New York 1.251 (.2074) *** .218 .3771 (.2586)   
North Carolina .1416 (.2929)   -.3197 (.3773)   
Texas .5099 (.2109) * .134 -.2576 (.2699)   
Washington .6182 (.2843) * .055 .7447 (.3214) * .038 
Constant -.3389 (.5546)  .621 1.138 (.7247)  .161 
N 3,653   3,653    
Wald Chi-sq 487.56   487.56    
% Pred Correctly 62.1%   62.1%    
Prop Reduction Error 6.1%   6.1%    
     Note: Basecategory for multinomial logit is Republican (y=3) 
 
The independent variables we are most interested in are immigrant generation, ethnic 
identity, and the interaction between generation and identity.  In addition, we expect 
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experienced discrimination to also have an important effect by contributing to higher levels 
of Democratic partisanship. 
As the results in table 4 demonstrate, the relationship between generation and ethnic 
identity is complex.  The variable generation is negative and significant suggesting that across 
generation, Latinos become less Democratic.  However, with the interaction term in the 
model, the direct effect for generation assumes the slope for low-ethnic identifiers across 
generation.  The interaction term generation x ethnic id is positive and significant suggesting 
that for high ethnic identifiers, Democratic partisanship increases over successive 
generations in the U.S.  This relationship is best expressed in figure 1 below which plots the 
predicted probability of Democratic partisanship across generation, and accounting for 
degree of ethnic identity.  The top line is for strong ethnic identifiers and increases from a 
59.8% probability of being Democrat in the first generation to 63.6% in the second 
generation, 67.1% in the third generation, and 70.4% in the fourth generation.  In contrast, 
Latinos with low ethnic identity become less  Democratic over generation.  As depicted in 
the bottom line, first generation immigrants with low group id have a 56.4% probability of 
being Democrat, compared to 55% among second generation, 53.1% in the third generation, 
and 50.7% in the fourth generation. We note very little difference between the probability of 
Democratic partisanship among first generation immigrants based on their degree of ethnic 
identity, however the gap steadily grows across generation and by the fourth generation a 20-
point difference in the probability of being a Democrat exists.  (In the logit model when 
Independents are excluded the results are exactly the same, the only difference being the 
intercepted about 10-15 points higher towards Democratic partisanship) 
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A strong sense of ethnic identity generates not just higher levels of Democratic partisanship, 
but a much more cohesive political group.  The variation around the predicted probabilities 
for strong id is much tighter than for weak id.  Figure 2 adds the bounds of the 95% 
confidence interval around each of the point estimates for strong and weak ethnic identity by 
generation.  Most obvious is that the shaded area around the strong id line is more tightly 
fitted to the line, while considerable variation exists of the weak id line.  This demonstrates 
that, across generation, Latinos with a high degree of ethnic identity are a very cohesive 
political group.  In the fourth generation, 95% of Latinos with low ethnic identity have 
between 40% and 61% probability of being Democrat.  In contrast, 95% of fourth 
generation Latinos with high ethnic identity are between 66% and 74% likely to be 
Democrats. 
Strong ID 
Weak ID 
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Finally, we find strong evidence that experienced discrimination increases the probability of 
Democratic partisanship.  Latinos who state they have not experienced discrimination across 
four domains (jobs, police, housing, social) are 6.2% less likely to be Democrats than those 
who have experienced in each domain – 60.8% probability compared to 67.0%. We think 
there are two factors at play in this relationship.  On the one hand, increased perceptions of 
discrimination against Latinos, and actual experienced discrimination may make Latinos 
more supportive of the Democratic Party which has historically been associated with anti-
discrimination policies and the  protection of civil rights.  Beyond this direct connection, we 
may expect that exposure to discrimination increases a sense of group consciousness.  
Sanchez finds that Latinos who have experienced discrimination are significantly more likely 
to believe in concepts such as linked fate and group consciousness, creating an overall 
heightened sense of ethnic identity.  As we observe in figure 1 above, strong ethnic identity 
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Fig 3. Latino Party Unity by Experienced Discrimination
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contributes to Democratic partisanship.  Thus, discrimination may have both a direct and 
indirect influence on Latino partisanship. 
 Overall, we find high levels of ethnic identity, and high levels of partisan unity 
among Latinos.  Data from the 2006 LNS demonstrate that Latinos maintain a high degree 
of Democratic partisanship across generation because of the effect of ethnic identity.  As 
Latinos move farther away from the immigrant experience, a strong sense of ethnic identity 
contributes to increasing group cohesiveness and Democratic partisanship. 
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Appendix: Replication of Models 
 
 
Replication of model with dichotomous dependent variable 
Dep var is partisanship, 0=Rep 1=Dem 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
Generation -0.2730 0.1613 t 
Ethnic ID -0.0611 0.1130  
Generation x Ethnic ID 0.0953 0.0446 * 
Discrimination 0.1538 0.0487 ** 
Spanish scale 0.0283 0.0470  
Puerto Rico -0.0994 0.1633  
Cuba -1.3333 0.2045 *** 
Dominican 0.4518 0.3229  
Central America -0.2657 0.2057  
South America 0.3422 0.2700  
Age 0.0141 0.0030 *** 
Education 0.0076 0.0150  
Income 0.0000 0.0000  
Female 0.3942 0.0891 *** 
Married -0.1978 0.0976 * 
Home owner -0.3997 0.1151 *** 
Catholic 0.5091 0.0931 *** 
Union household 0.3217 0.1188 ** 
Arizona 1.0928 0.2748 *** 
Arkansas 0.0669 0.2940  
California 0.6510 0.2044 *** 
Colorado 0.6310 0.2580 * 
D.C. metro 0.9503 0.2752 *** 
Georgia 0.0325 0.2779  
Illinois 1.2713 0.2380 *** 
Iowa 0.7328 0.2675 ** 
Nevada 0.4636 0.2711 t 
New Jersey 0.5278 0.2193 * 
New Mexico 0.7561 0.2372 *** 
New York 1.2290 0.2081 *** 
North Carolina 0.0984 0.2921  
Texas 0.5249 0.2126 * 
Washington 0.5573 0.2856 * 
Constant -0.4552 0.5693  
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Appendix 
 
 
Replication of multinomial logit model with hierarchical linear model, nested by state 
Dep var is partisanship, 1=Dem 2=Ind 3=Rep, basecategory is Rep 
 
 Democrat (y=1) Independent (y=2) 
 Coef. Std Err P>|z| Coef. Std Err P>|z| 
Generation -0.2714 0.1587 t -0.3530 0.2113 t 
Ethnic ID -0.0748 0.1121  -0.1276 0.1380  
Generation x Ethnic ID 0.0962 0.0443 * 0.0495 0.0592  
Discrimination 0.1545 0.0469 *** 0.1790 0.0587 ** 
Spanish scale 0.0362 0.0447  0.1549 0.0576 ** 
Puerto Rico -0.1483 0.1379  -0.2553 0.1701  
Cuba -1.4597 0.1765 *** -0.9954 0.2237 *** 
Dominican 0.4174 0.2916  0.3635 0.3310  
Central America -0.3021 0.1975  -0.4062 0.2424 t 
South America 0.2274 0.2360  -0.3258 0.3105  
Age 0.0143 0.0029 *** -0.0137 0.0038 *** 
Education 0.0070 0.0143  -0.0448 0.0174 ** 
Income 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 t 
Female 0.3839 0.0879 *** 0.3135 0.1122 ** 
Married -0.2252 0.0957 * 0.0774 0.1219  
Home owner -0.4142 0.1098 *** -0.2745 0.1347 * 
Catholic 0.5114 0.0909 *** 0.1509 0.1156  
Union household 0.3433 0.1154 ** -0.0528 0.1540  
Constant 0.2603 0.5388  1.3055 0.6708 * 
Variances and Covariances of random effects    
Level 2: state 0.0801 0.0329 **    
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Appendix 
 
 
Replication of logit model with hierarchical linear model, nested by state 
Dep var is partisanship, 0=Rep 1=Dem 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
Generation -0.2745 0.1632 t 
Ethnic ID -0.0611 0.1152  
Generation x Ethnic ID 0.0957 0.0455 * 
Discrimination 0.1546 0.0473 *** 
Spanish scale 0.0229 0.0455  
Puerto Rico -0.1183 0.1298  
Cuba -1.3896 0.1738 *** 
Dominican 0.4223 0.2885  
Central America -0.2553 0.2028  
South America 0.3337 0.2386  
Age 0.0141 0.0030 *** 
Education 0.0074 0.0147  
Income 0.0000 0.0000  
Female 0.3949 0.0890 *** 
Married -0.2072 0.0971 * 
Home owner -0.4041 0.1106 *** 
Catholic 0.5109 0.0922 *** 
Union household 0.3331 0.1163 ** 
Constant -0.0760 0.5510  
Variances and covariances of random effects 
Level 2: state 0.2594 0.0828 ** 
 
 
 
 
